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In this paper, I will develop two major claims. First the, Fu-
ture Internet should be polymorphic and conciliate different
architectural paradigms networking. The second claim is that
the Future Internet should be build on strong theoretical basis
from a Networking science that is in course of development.
In this paper, I have used the concept of cooperation as an
interpretation lens. Specifically, I will describe how virtual-
isation make possible a polymorphic future Internet and en-
ables the easy deployment of new cooperation schemes. The
next aspect that I describe in this paper is relative to security
in future Internet. Particularly the paper advocates the neces-
sity of three major components: a secure execution platform,
an authentication mechanism, and a monitoring component.
Finally, I will show that it is possible to build scalable ad-
dressing and routing scheme but at the condition of following
a clean slate approach.
Index Terms— Future Internet, Internet Science, Network
Architecture
1. INTRODUCTION
Based on one of the major stories about the origin of the In-
ternet, Internet came to the age of 40 at 22:30 hours on Oc-
tober 29, 1969. During its 40 years lifetime, it grew from a
small three nodes network build mainly for computer time-
sharing, to a network connecting an estimated 1,800 million
users and a penetration rate of almost 25%. No human built
system has ever reached such a growth rate in such a short
time. What was once a tool known and used by only a small
intelligentsia of high profile researchers, has become within
one generation a universal commodity, like electricity, in the
daily life of hundreds of millions of users. This shed light
on the importance of the on going discussion about the “fu-
ture Internet.” Several initiatives envision the definition, the
design, and the construction of this future Internet. On the
research side, the US based GENI (Global Environment for
Network Innovation) initiative [1], and the European Union
FIRE (Future Internet Research and Experimentation) initia-
tive [2] are noteworthy and many of other activities in differ-
ent countries can be cited. More generally, the United Na-
tions World Summits on Information Society held in 2007
and 2009 enlarged the scope of Internet as the main compo-
nent of the Information Society of the future by introducing
cultural aspects in a more formal way. That said, this flurry
of interest on the future of Internet is also a source of con-
fusion; different and competitive requirements as well as ar-
chitectural concepts are fogging our vision of the future of
Internet.
My aim in this talk is indeed not to add up to the existing
fog by sprinkling my “yet another” new and clever archi-
tectural conception of how the community should shape the
future of the Internet. I have in this paper two claims: first
that future Internet should be polymorphic, i.e. that it will
need to conciliate inside it different architectural paradigms.
Particularly, the future Internet would have (at least in a long
transitory period) to support the evolution of the current In-
ternet in form of IPv6 or any other evolution of the current IP
architecture along with other more revolutionary paradigms.
Therefore, the main property of the future Internet should
be flexibility to enable their smooth coexistence. My sec-
ond position is that networking is not simply a technological
artefact, but it is becoming a separate science that borrows
some of its principles from other well-established sciences
as computer science, physics, social science, etc. and has
also its own particular fundamental laws and principles, sim-
ilar to any other science. Describing the particular principles
of this “Networking Science” and differentiating them from
the principles of other sciences is one of the major scien-
tific challenges that the Internet and more generally the net-
working research community has to overcome in the coming
years. Indeed, by looking at networking in its broadest view,
one can see that networking in form of roads, postal service
and telephony have a very long history. However, it is only
during the past years that with the development of social net-
works and wide availability of Internet that it becomes obvi-
ous that these historical networks and the new comer Internet
should have common principles that have still to be fully in-
vestigated in the context of networking science.
Obviously, if such networking fundamental principles exist,
the future Internet will also follow them naturally. Unfortu-
nately, finding fundamental principles for networks is still a
research effort. Being realistic, I will only be able in this
paper, to shed some lights about major questions that the
community will have to tackle in the path toward the future
Internet. Being invited to give a keynote, I will be a little
more radical than I am generally as I want to ignite thought-
provoking discussions and open new perspectives.
2. COOPERATION: THE VERY ESSENCE OF
NETWORKING
First, let’s dig into the basics of networking. It is possible
to define a network as a set of nodes that are cooperating
with each other to distribute (exchange) information. How-
ever, one has to formalise the concept of cooperation further.
The main role of a node in a network is to generate infor-
mation in form of messages, packets, signals, etc. We can
therefore state that a networking component receives from
its neighbours (other components, nodes, or layers) and/or
its environment a sequence of incoming messages or infor-
mation and generates a sequence of outgoing messages. The
relation between incoming and outgoing information streams
defines the cooperation function (or forwarding function) the
node implements.
We have been educated to consider networks through the lay-
ered approach of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)
model. In this approach the inputs to the cooperation func-
tion come only from the predecessor layer and concern vari-
ables relative to components in the same layer; the resulting
value is sent to next layer. Therefore, the layered architecture
and the associated protocols constrains the space of possible
cooperations between nodes to make it tractable and to for-
malise it. This layered view has been the major architectural
paradigm in the past three decades. Layers opacity and inde-
pendence enabled the programmers to concentrate on a sin-
gle layer and to implement services without needing to tussle
with other layers.
However, layering comes with a performance cost. Cross
layering, i.e. enabling a layer to access information and
to interact with any other layers, has been advocated for
higher efficiency, performance, resource management, and
security. These arguments have been important in the emer-
gence of the “autonomic network” idea. In this approach,
a network component is seen as an active element that is
“self-conscious” and that interacts with its environment.
All the above considerations have resulted in a major shift of
the networking paradigm that has moved away from a lay-
ered, to a puzzle view where autonomic components are “co-
operating” with each other. This results in enabling the use of
information coming from different layers for implementing
the cooperation function. The classical view considered the
operation of a network element as processing packets. Now
the role of a network is considered as deciding (based on
data received in the past and information’s gathered from the
environment) which type of cooperative functions the node
(or the node owner) should be implemented to achieve the
goals of the network (defined by the network operator, or the
service provider), as well as its selfish goals (defined by the
owner of the node). This opens the way for a node to behave
differently from what the classical protocols predict (for ex-
ample to go to a standby mode, or to open a tunnel to im-
plements its specific cooperation function). Accepting that
nodes can be selfish is a major change, motivated by applica-
tive scenarios like ad-hoc wireless networks where one can-
not assume that all nodes will belong to the same authority.
Inter-domain routing at the Autonomous System (AS) level
is another scenario where selfishness is essential. In this last
situation, the different network operators have to cooperate
even if they might be in fierce competition. Cooperation be-
tween selfish nodes is a central element of the future Internet
architecture.
Moreover, cooperation is also the central concept of this de-
veloping science of networking. Networking science studies
the production, distribution, and consumption of “informa-
tion” and is cooperation for information exchange, precisely
what a network does! Information has some specific prop-
erties that differentiate it from other goods and therefore ne-
cessitate a new theoretical treatment: information is universal
and infinitely reusable, i.e., a bit of information can be dupli-
cated and shared infinitely at almost no cost. Another differ-
ence is that information is ambiguous, i.e. you might receive
ambiguous messages when other goods and services are un-
ambiguous. These two peculiar properties that are the basis
of Information Theory as developed by Shannon differentiate
Networking science from Classical economy. To illustrate
this difference, one can look at the controversy existing in
the economical literature on the Efficient-Market Hypothesis
that asserts that financial markets are “informationally effi-
cient”. This hypothesis assumes that prices on traded assets
(e.g., stocks, bonds, or property) reflect all past available in-
formation. However, the validity of this hypothesis has been
questioned (critics even blame the belief in rational markets
for much of the financial crisis of 2007–2010). This shows
that unconsciously information is seen as an external concept
helping in shaping the prices, and not as a normal asset and
some mechanisms should be provided to make this informa-
tion available to make market efficient.
While, in the layered view network services are built over a
predefined set of cooperation primitives (named Service Ac-
cess Points in the OSI jargon), in autonomic networks the
node has to permanently monitor its environment to optimise
its cooperative behaviour based on information coming from
a different layer of the classical layered architecture. While
the optimisation can result in better performance, it adds a
level of complexity and careless optimisation can even lead
to lower performance as the information coming from differ-
ent level of networks can be contradictory. Amajor challenge
facing the networking research community consists of devel-
oping methods for online and autonomic optimisation of this
cooperation.
3. TO CLEAN THE SLATE OR NOT? IS IT REALLY
AN ISSUE?
From its inception 40 years ago, Internet was designed, de-
veloped and deployed simultaneously. More precisely when-
ever a problem arose, a solution was proposed and analysed
following a technical consensus at the IETF resulting in a Re-
quest For Comment (RFC) solving the issue or implementing
a new feature. The IETF consensus guaranted that the pro-
posed evolution of Internet was backward compatible and
was complying with the sacrosanct axiom of “no harm to
what works”. The previous guarantee is one of the expla-
nation of the huge success and relative stability of current
Internet. However, the drawback of this approach is that it
contrains the future evolution and hinders the deployment of
radical solutions that attack the problems at the source. This
is one major reason for the clean slate approach advocated
by a part of the community.
The clean slate approach comes from the belief that it is
impossible to resolve the challenges facing today’s Internet
without rethinking the fundamental assumptions and design
decisions underlying its current architecture. The incremen-
tal approach changes the Internet architecture by backward
compatible patches; the clean slate approach advocates out
of the box thinking with an architectural redesign with better
concepts and abstractions to answer the current challenges.
However, as explained in the introduction we expect the fu-
ture Internet to be polymorphic. Specifically the future Inter-
net should be flexible enough to conciliate coexistence of the
evolution of the actual Internet with the incremental patches
with approaches coming out of the clean slate vision. There-
fore, the future Internet should be designed so that the ques-
tion of cleaning the slate or not should not be anymore rel-
evant. Clean slate–based revolutionary research should go
along with evolutionary approaches to ensure that the work-
ing Internet will still continue to work in parallel with new
architecture with more features. We will describe later why
we believe that such a flexibility is achievable and why there-
fore cleaning the slate or not is not an issue.
Nonetheless, imagining new architecture is a tough task. We
need to choose among the large set of possible architectures,
the few that could take the relay of the current Internet. For
this purpose, we need to experiment different architectures in
large scale experimental facilities. This explains why almost
all initiative on the future Internet are backed by a large scale
experimental facility like PlanetLab [3], GENI [1], etc.
4. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE
INTERNET MOTIVATIONS AND RATIONALES
It is natural to ask why people are questing for a future Inter-
net. Internet as we know it today has certainly gone beyond
the wildest expectations of it is first pioneers and even its
current status addresses a large spectra of nowadays needs.
However, there is a consensus in the research community and
in larger audience that the current Internet has some short-
ages that make its evolution and/or revolution inevitable. I
will give here some of the main reasons that are provided
and shed some lights on the directions to go.
4.1. Flexibility or the future Internet contortionist
I explained previously that the future Internet should be poly-
morphic and its architecture be flexible enough to accommo-
date different cooperation paradigms in parallel. Another ra-
tionale for a flexible future Internet architecture is relative to
new application deployment. The current Internet provides a
very large freedom for developers to develop their own ap-
plicative protocols. However, it does not provide architec-
tural hooks to deploy services beyond the socket interface;
developers have no access to routing and addressing. But
routing is an essential component for the cooperation pro-
vided by network. For this reason during the past decade,
routing and addressing was frequently raised into the applica-
tion level where the developers can have an impact on them.
Peer to Peer and overlay networks are examples of this ap-
proach and implement a complete cooperation scheme into
the application level (more precisely above the socket inter-
face). While this approach has been very successful, it is
not really optimal as the packets have still to go through the
underlying services narrow hip hourglass of IP that acts as
a bottleneck. A network where one could implement, and
deploy its new network protocols or cooperation schemes
without disturbing other running protocols, would solve the
application deployment issue, and will moreover provide a
fantastic platform for innovative service deployment.
The quest for a flexible platform that will enable concur-
rent execution of different networking mechanisms along
with easy deployment has been pursued in the networking
research community with the objective of building a flexible
experimentation platform for the future Internet research.
This has resulted in the development of Planetlab [3], its
European counterpart OneLab [4] and Global Environment
for Network Innovations (GENI) [1]. The flexibility in these
experimental platforms was attained thanks to the wide gen-
eralisation of virtualisation approaches [5] that enabled the
parallel running of several virtual machines over a single
hardware. As virtualisation ensures full isolation (fault, soft-
ware, and performance isolation) between virtual machines,
it enables the parallel execution of different networking sys-
tems (routing, addressing, etc.) and opens the way for the
polymorphic future Internet I was advocating.
Virtualisation techniques also ensure the ability to encapsu-
late a full virtual machine into a single file that can be easily
migrated to a virtualised hardware and being run on it. The
encapsulation property opens the perspective of easy deploy-
ment of services by just distributing encapsulated virtual ma-
chine implementing the service over a large infrastructure of
virtualised servers/routers. Last but not least, virtualisation
approaches also ensure Interposition (to be discussed below)
for monitoring and security. With the continuous increase
in processing power available in commodity hardware, there
has been a growing interest in developing new router archi-
tectures based on virtualisation running over clusters of mul-
ticore computers. This opens the perspective of building re-
alistic routers implementing the polymorphic future Internet.
4.2. Security: the Achille’s heel of the current Internet
One of the major rationales for the development of a future
Internet is security. Indeed, the current Internet is plagued
with spam, phishing, denial of service attacks, exploits and
other security problems. However, one should be careful
to not mix apples and oranges. Only a small proportion of
problems referred as related to security, are resulting from
the Internet architecture, e.g., even if phishing is an impor-
tant security issue, it cannot be related directly to Internet
architecture. One has therefore, to separate what is relative
to application security (ensuring that an application is doing
what it is supposed to do), to communication security (ensur-
ing that communication remain secret) and finally to network
security (ensuring that cooperation on network is secure).
The approach of the current Internet architecture to security
is minimalist. Security was not considered to be an essen-
tial component of the network architecture, even in IPv6 that
integrates an IPSEC component. It was seen at best as an
optional service. The absence of security related elements
inside the architecture can be seen as the root cause of the
current security status, where we have an abundance of se-
curity service (VPNs, firewalls, proxies, SSL, etc.). As a re-
action, some advocate for integrating all security primitives
inside the architecture so that application can fully rely on
network security services. This last view is also highly ques-
tionable as too much security has a heavy impact on network
devices performance. The future Internet will have to find
an in–between way between these two extremes. Indeed, the
future Internet architecture should provide some support for
application and communication security. However, we have
still to determine the least common denominator of security
support that should be integrated into the architecture and
what should be seen rather as a service that will cooperate
with other components through the architecture.
It is noteworthy that security is a negative concept: you do
not know when you have it; you only know when you have
lost it. This means that, rather than speak about providing
security, one should talk about reducing the vulnerabilities.
Almost 30 years of experience in Internet security has taught
us that it is impossible (and too costly) to remove all risks,
meaning that we have to accept that we will continue to live
with a risky network. The consequence of the above state-
ment in cooperation terms is that we have to increase the
resilience of the future Internet architecture to ensure sur-
vivability and to reduce the impact of security risks. In other
words, security risks should be assumed as plausible opera-
tional hypothesis in the design of networked system and ar-
chitectural solution should be provided to detect and to con-
tain them. This is a radically different position from the cur-
rent approaches where the emphasis is rather put on authen-
tication of users through passwords/biometrics and assuming
that authenticated users are entitled to do whatever they do.
In the collaborative approach, we have to assume that users
(even authenticated) can misbehave and we should be able to
detect and contain them.
Therefore, in the light of cooperation concerns, the future
Internet architecture needs at least three basic security mech-
anisms: a mechanism shielding strictly and at the deepest
level possible components running in the same execution en-
vironment (like a sandbox), a mechanism ensuring authenti-
cation (the type and level of authentication still pending) to
ensure the identity of the running code owner, and a monitor-
ing mechanism that will evaluate the cooperation behaviour
of executing components and compare them with some nor-
mal or expected behaviours. None of these mechanisms exist
nowadays in Internet, but the current proposal of building the
future Internet with virtualised concepts goes in the direction
of addressing the first and last needs, as system virtualisation
should guarantee fault, performance, and execution isolation,
and monitor (or hypervisor or virtual machine monitor) inter-
position. It is, however, noteworthy that even if we have now
monitoring mechanisms in virtualisation kernels, very little
is known on the methodology of monitoring to detect ab-
normalities of networking components. The authentication
service is also still subject to discussion. It is not yet clear if
a global authentication and/or identity mechanism is manda-
tory, or only a local, and trust-based scheme will be enough
to cover the large spectrum of scenario the future Internet
will have to deal with.
The necessity of monitoring results is a major tradeoff
between performance and security; the more security we
choose, the stricter and the more exhaustive would be the
monitoring. This results in a higher share of processing
power assigned to monitoring and therefore a loss of perfor-
mance for the monitored activities. Moreover, monitoring
means also to reduce the range of acceptable behaviour to
be able to differentiate them from abnormal ones. We have
also a tradeoff between flexibility (in term of the range of
acceptable behaviour) and security. So, while security nowa-
days is an important issue in Internet, it seems that security
for the future Internet should be considered with a paradigm
shift rather than just trying to push existing approaches and
mechanisms into the foundations of the new architecture.
4.3. Scalability or the delusion of grandeurs
Another issue that should be considered in the future Inter-
net is scalability. The past decade has seen a mean growth of
Internet traffic of almost 100% per year. The size of routing
table that is the main indicator of the complexity of the rout-
ing operation has seen a yearly growth of 19.4% from 2002
to 2008 [6]. Even if this rate has decreased to 8% during the
past two years because of exhaustion of IPv4 address space
(that is expected to happen in mid 2011) the growth rate is
still considerable. Moreover, mobile Internet revolution and
the Internet of things will increase significantly the dimen-
sion of the devices connected trough Internet space.
The current Internet has dealt with scalability by using a hi-
erarchical architecture separating the different issues of rout-
ing in three different levels. The lowest level deals with local
connectivity and configuration of interfaces IP addresses link
layer mechanisms (essentially through Ethernet). The sec-
ond level introduces IP routing between subnets by assuming
that the local connectivity is provided inside a network mask.
The third level implements operators’ policies through BGP
filtering and announcement rules, assuming that an AS op-
erator is wise enough to provide optimal connectivity inside
itself.
Once upon a time, not so far in 1981, one could read in
RFC 790, “The assignment of numbers is also handled by
Jon. If you are developing a protocol or application that will
require the use of a link, socket, port, protocol, or network
number please contact Jon to receive a number assignment.”
Indeed, this situation was not tenable and Regional Internet
Registries (RIR) took care of Internet addresses. However,
address allocations had to remain compatible with previously
allocated addresses. This backward compatibility constraint
results in address fragmentation. CIDR (Classless Internet
Domain Routing) was an attempt to reduce the burden of
the past allocations. Indeed, this leveraged the pressure of
address space exhaustion, but it did not solve radically the
problem. The IPv6 standard solved radically the issue of ad-
dress space exhaustion, and gave the impression that with
an almost unlimited addressing space, its optimisation is not
anymore needed. However, even with IPv6 the source of the
scalability problem that was address space fragmentation re-
mained. Moreover, IPv6 showed the difficulty of introducing
radical changes into the network. Nearly a decade after most
of the IPv6 standard was completed the vast majority of soft-
ware and hardware still uses IPv4.
IPv6 never answered the cardinal question: “why do we need
an address and how can we answer this need?” A trivial an-
swer can be: “We need addresses to do routing.” This lead
to an even more radical question: “do we need routing?”
The advent of Delay Tolerant Networks showed that routing
might not be possible in some scenarios. It was even shown
that network coding, which is not based on routing, is the for-
warding scheme optimising the throughput [7]. More precise
investigation shows that IPv6 or IPv4, rather than providing
an answer for addressing needs, provides a roughly clever
way of indexing the 32 or 128 bits address space. The past
decade has seen first attempts at answering the general ques-
tion of addressing. In these works, addressing was defined
as a topological embedding adapted to a particular cooper-
ation need, i.e. addressing is a function returning the posi-
tion of the needed information into a topological space. It
was shown that when the embedding is compact, i.e. when
two close-by items are mapped by the addressing embedding
into close addresses, addressing implies routing and vice–
versa. In other words, if one knows the address of what he
wants, he can derive directly from the address the path to
reach it. This property means that scalable routing is pos-
sible and even trivial, when a compact embedding exists.
Indeed, IP (either v4 or v6) addressing is not compact as
close nodes are not necessarily close in the IP address space.
Nonetheless, compact embeddings exist. For example, Con-
tent Addressable Network (with the assumption of no node
withdrawal) [8] defines a compact embedding. The question
of knowing whether we can embed the particular address-
ing need of a specific cooperation scheme into a compact
embedding is one of the major questions of the Networking
Science. For example, very general embeddings can be build
that maps an IP like address space into a compact space with
some performance costs [9]. Peer–to–Peer (P2P) and over-
lay networks have demonstrated that by lifting IP address-
ing backward compatibility constrainsts, scalability can be
achieved and address fragmentation avoided. This validates
the necessity of having a clean-slate approach rather than an
evolutionary approach for developing the future Internet to
enable deployment of new addressing/routing schemes. In-
deed, one can note that IP addresses is still needed even on
P2P or overlay networks. However, this is more a kind of
link layer connectivity issue than a fundamental need of IP
addressing.
This discussion sheds light on how to ensure the scalabil-
ity of routing and addressing in future Internet. To summa-
rize, contrary to the current Internet where routing tables are
populated only with non-compact IP addresses, the future
Internet should enable more flexible routing schemes with
the choice of the suitable addressing embedding. Anyway,
as explained before, the future Internet would be polymor-
phic and should simultaneously support execution of differ-
ent addressing/routing schemes (embeddings), so that clas-
sical IPv4/v6 routing and addressing is expected to co-exist
with more scalable schemes.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we stated two main positions. First that the fu-
ture Internet should be polymorphic, meaning that it should
enable the coexistence of different networking paradigms in
the same framework. I advocated that virtualisation tech-
niques that are nowadays common provide the flexible tech-
nology needed for building such a polymorphic future Inter-
net. The second position in this paper is that the future Inter-
net needs a networking science to build strongly its founda-
tions over it. I stated that the essential concept in the scien-
tific approach to network is the concept of cooperation, and
I used this concept to analyse some of the important issues I
foresee for the future Internet design and deployment. This
discussion resulted in some views on security, scalability, and
flexibility in the current and the future Internet.
Specifically, I argued that the future Internet would be poly-
morphic. So the future Internet architecture should take ad-
vantage from the flexibility resulting from virtualisation to
make possible a polymorphic architecture that adapts to the
specific cooperation needs of the network applications. This
flexibility will also be mandatory to ensure that new appli-
cations and services can be easily deployed in the future In-
ternet, making this platform more attractive than the current
Internet for innovation and businesses. The next aspect dis-
cussed in the paper was security. My position about security
was that the future Internet will need to integrate some se-
curity mechanisms in its core architecture. I listed three ba-
sic and mandatory mechanisms: a secure execution platform
(that could be provided by sandbox virtualisation), an au-
thentication mechanism with an identification scope that has
yet to be defined, and a monitoring component that could ob-
serve networking (cooperation) activity and eventually filter
out all anomalous activities. The last topic developed in the
paper was scalability. My position is that recent theoretical
works showed that it is possible to construct infinitely scal-
able addressing and routing scheme by using suitable embed-
dings. This adds some arguments, to other strong rationales,
in favor of a clean slate approach to future Internet design
where out-of-the-box thinking with an architectural redesign
is possible. Nonetheless, I argued that if future Internet is
designed with polymorphism in mind, to clean the slate or
not is not anymore a crucial question, as the future Internet
should be able to accommodate a completely revolutionary
networking architecture as well as a more evolutionary one.
At the end, I would like to thank Serge Fdida, Professor at
Paris VI university about interesting discussions about the
architecture of Future Internet, and the anonymous reviewers
for their valuable advice.
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